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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OTG

DATE: 20 Jan 72

SUBJECT

: BOC 1/72, Final Critique

- 1. I must look at this course in an entirely different manner than most of the other trainees in it due to my previous experiences with the Agency in both the PM and FI fields, and having run unilateral FI cases in addition to having had primary liaison responsibilities for our counterpart organization during my last assignment.
- 2. I find myself generally impressed with the live problem situation, and had no difficulty interjecting myself into it completely (looking upon it as a sort of cover situation to be played to the maximum). I found this vehicle to be satisfactory to cover the training, and feel that I gained a great deal in this formal training experience. The writing and reporting exercises did me particular good as I now have more confidence in my ability to write intelligence reports and convey my thinking on paper. I have had a great deal of experience in dealing with people under strained circumstances (outside the Agency) and therefore do not believe that I gained much from this aspect; but it was good practice. The face to face aspects of the course were meaningful, but somewhat overly repetative for me; however I recognize the need for them, and the practice does have its purpose for me. As a result of this course, it is my opinion that I have a firmer grip on tradecraft principles, and I know my limitations with regard to these.

25X1A

3. One presentation which left me cold was the class pertaining to liaison (please note that I would be somewhat biased in this area having worked with liaison for almost five years - in Vietnam and came away from this presentation with the impression that liaison duty was something to be avoided like the plague. It would be my opinion, based on the panel discussions, that I, as a newly assigned officer to any Station, working with liaison, had not been highly thought of, and therefore had been assigned this duty which nobody else in the Station wanted. I left with the impression that, If I were assigned such a task I would look upon it as something to get over with as quickly as possible, and get on with the more important jobs to be accomplished. I believe that this would show through in my dealings (if I was really convinced on this point) with the liaison service, and in fact, I would accomplish very little with them which would continue the vicious circle. I wonder if we do not too often judge the liaison service by our own standards, rather than by their standards, and therefore do not consider the real potential of the service (CI-wise also). I believe that a negative presentation will leave a sour taste which will be reflected in the CO's attitude towards his counterparts in the liaison service. I think this presentation need not be as negative as it appeared to be.

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Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78-062 A000200030029-8

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2 of Final Critique

25X1A2g

4. I will discuss the individual exercises in reverse order, starting with the last one, 25X1A

There was not sufficient activity for a five man team during the exercise. The problem appears constructed for the four man team and the five man teams should be given additional tasks to perform to make up for the extra man on the team. This might be accomplished through the introduction of other face to face meetings in both phases of the problem, perhaps making LaRoche a Staff or Career Agent (to be handled) in the first phase; and introducing in the second phase, perhaps the KGB handler of the agent Maynard. (It is recognized that were the weather better in Florida, there may not have been the morale problems caused by inactivity, i.e. sitting in a motel room - on the beach would have been much better.) I recognize the need for a team leader on a problem such as this, but I found myself hesitant (as a fellow student) to be as forceful in some areas as I would have been in actual operations. I refused to engage in "makework" exercises, believing that it would have been counterproductive inasmuch as such would have become immediately noted and resisted. There was some hesitancy in the surveillance aspects which would not have been a problem in an actual situation, with the fear of arrest being prominent in his thinking and therefore there was a resistence to engage in close surveillance. The surveillance aspects of the problem were entirely too short and there was no real challenge experienced. (I found that there was a problem devorcing one team member from the school situation, with him believing that once seen by the I/A he would be blown/recognized; which of course was not the case, as in the problem, the agent would have never seen him before and would not know him as an intelligence officer from Williamsburg. This aspect might be better explained during the pre-problem briefings.)

25X1A2g

B. This was an excellant operation and it should be continued and expanded into the situation.

25X1A2g

C. Not very meaningful for me individually, but certainly is important for the new officers of the silent service.

25X1A2g

D. This was good, but the time allotted for the exercise was totally unrealistic. Any defector would not make his initial move during a period of the day/week which did not allow him menough time to conduct his business, and 25 minutes is not enough time.

25X1A2g

E. Exc ellant experience, and very realistic.

25X1A2g

Again an excellant experience for me and I enjoyed it.

25X1A14a

G. No Help.

25X1A2q

H. I enjoyed this exchange very much and I wouldn't change it in any way.

25X1A2g

I. No help to me, having done for real in the past.

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Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP78-06210A000200030029-8

Page 3 of Final Critique

25X1A2g

J. I found this to be a meaningful, realistic problem in which I was able to emerse myself without difficulty. Even though it may have appeared so, I had not tried to G-2 the problem (to 0/0), but merely was giving out my thought processes on the desposal problems which may be encountered. I enjoyed this.

25X1A2g

K. Enjoyed this greatly and believe that it has real meaning for the new (or old) case officer.

25X1A2g

that should be engrained in any case officer going into a strange area to operate. (I believe some of our more junior case officers - still in the University/college thought processes - had difficulty with this one because of the fact they felt they should have pictures drawn for them as to just what they were expected to do. I do believe that this is a good problem to use in breaking this idea our younger generation has, that everything has to be in black and white. It may be necessary to tell them that they are expected to do this, and then let them go. I had no problems whatso-ever in knowing, based on the briefings given, what was to be expected.)

25X1A2g

This was a good exercise for me as it got me into the mental state necessary to act and react to the course. It put me firmly (through my mistakes) into the live problem situation.

5. I must say that I entered these doors with an apprehension as to what value I could get from attending this course, but this was soon dispelled and I believe that I got out of the course exactly what I put into it - which is the way it should be. I do not feel it necessary or of value (other than as stated above) to go into the individual subjects.

25X1A9a

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